Over the past decade there have been a variety of arguments made explaining how regional integration in Africa can improve economic and political development. There have also been arguments stating that regional integration can serve as a preemptive tool to mitigating war and instituting peace, the premier example being that of the European Union (EU). The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) has argued that regional cooperation can result in “higher economic growth, improved and effective transport infrastructure and the development of a reliable electricity supply, all of which will help to reduce poverty.”

Although the primary motive of regional integration is improving intra-trade networks and developing the economy, the expectation is that it will improve human development in all the countries involved. Integrating smaller countries can result in an upscale of development and provide a platform for more growth that would result in a reduction of poverty and increase in wealth and job opportunities. Has this theory been effectively turned into practice? The East African Community (EAC) is regarded as one of the fastest growing regional economies in the world, having averaged 6.3% annual growth amongst its member states over the past six years and is now touted as a model for the rest of Africa. Yet, if you apply the theory and arguments of how regional integration can result in higher economic growth and a reduction of poverty, one country provides a case study that serves as a counter-argument, Burundi.

Burundi was officially admitted into the EAC in July 2007, together with Rwanda. At the time of joining the EAC, it was the only country with significant internal conflict and a
newly concluded civil war. Skeptics thought it odd to bring Burundi into the fold due to its recent history of internal conflict. Those who supported its integration argued that joining the EAC would help stabilize Burundi by expanding its economic and development opportunities as well as providing moral and political support to deepening its internal peace and reconciliation processes. The results have so far been mixed, especially with regards to human development. There is scant evidence that regional integration has improved human development indicators in Burundi, providing further ammunition to integration skeptics. Does this mean regional integration does not work? Or has it just not worked for Burundi?

There are several reasons for exploring Burundi’s current context and future in the region, and that of its mostly poor and vulnerable population. First, it is the poorest country in the EAC, and faces a daunting array of development challenges. Right now, the country is ‘not on track to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015’ii Second, Burundi is emerging from devastating internal civil conflict and is struggling to consolidate peace and national cohesion. Third, there are new signs of donor disengagement from Burundi just when the country needs as many friends as it can get. What does this mean for the country’s prospects, particularly in view of the critical human development situation?

This GHEA Outlook seeks to explore the underreported story of Burundi and its relationship with the EAC. It will speculate what Burundi’s future might be as the dynamics of a volatile but important region changes. Could Burundi’s stability and future be seen as a cornerstone to solving one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s longest conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo? Or will Burundi be let go and allowed to ‘fail’ and descend into civil war once again? This Outlook also hopes to raise critical questions about regional integration. Does Burundi serve as an example and warning of allowing regional integration to only focus on hard issues like the economy and trade at the expense of softer issues like poverty and human development?

The East African Community (EAC) is one of the fastest growing regional economies in the world.

The financial sector has taken advantage of regional integration with banks opening new (and increasingly lucrative) operations in Burundi.
Burundi on the brink?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Population (2010)</td>
<td>9 million</td>
<td>Smallest in EAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (2010)</td>
<td>301 per sq. km</td>
<td>Second highest in EAC after Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of population living below the poverty line (2010)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Highest in EAC, little change since 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of people living in poverty</td>
<td>6.3 million</td>
<td>Increased by 1.5 million since 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per capita health care spending (2009)</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>Lowest in EAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five mortality rate (2010)</td>
<td>96 per 1,000</td>
<td>Second highest in EAC, after Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of stunting (under-five)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Highest in EAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (2009)</td>
<td>49.4 years</td>
<td>Lowest in EAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school enrollment (GER, 2009)</td>
<td>135%</td>
<td>Highest in EAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (2010, PPP)</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>Lowest in the EAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net aid disbursement per person (2010)</td>
<td>$74</td>
<td>Second highest in EAC, after Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Perception Index (2010)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Lowest in EAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure as percent of GDP (2009)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Highest in EAC, double that of closest competitors</td>
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Vital Statistics: Poor and Vulnerable

Burundi is a poor country with an almost overwhelming set of challenges, summarized by the sobering fact that 6.3 million of its citizens, or 70% of its total population, live below the poverty line. The high costs of food and living have affected many countries in the region but given the political and economic context of Burundi, the consequences have been magnified. This was demonstrated over the past year when the price of basic food items increased such as rice (12%), wheat flour (20%) and cassava flour (19%).

While its children will be enrolled in primary school as part of the country’s universal primary education, almost two-thirds of them are stunted, a sign of poor nutrition that will have an impact on their learning and reduce their future earning potential. In 2010, Burundi received $631 million in aid ($74 per person), which was almost 40% of its total GDP, the highest in the region. The country also spends the largest share of its income (4%) on its military in the region. It is also perceived as the most corrupt country in the EAC.

Prior to joining the EAC, Burundi’s vital signs were still considered the weakest in the region. Poverty levels in 2004 were between 65-70%, which equated to 4.8 million people living under the
President Yoweri Museveni has been honoured with the National Order the Republic of Burundi for his efforts towards the pacification of Burundi at Burundi’s 50th independence anniversary celebrations in Bujumbura.

Other leaders who attended the anniversary celebrations included: Presidents Mwai Kibaki (Kenya), Jakaya Kikwete (Tanzania), Joseph Kabila (Democratic Republic of Congo), Teodoro Obiang (Equatorial Guinea) and Sharif Sheikh Ahmed of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.

In his address to thousands during the colourful celebrations, President Nkurunziza commended Uganda and President Museveni, in particular, for his efforts in restoring peace and security in Burundi.

He said Burundi’s peace mission to Somalia is not aimed at achieving any personal benefit but it is a sacrifice in appreciation for the support Burundi got from countries that contributed to the peace in the country which is now more than ever needed by the people of Somalia.

He also called for faster tracking of the East African Community as one way of ensuring regional stability, security and development.

A statement by the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton expressed US’s commitment to Burundi’s political and economic development and eradication of poverty and promotion of economic stability in improving the lives and future of the people of Burundi.

Clinton also commended Burundi’s contribution to the African Union Mission in Somalia which she said has helped improve stability in the region and facilitated an environment where political reforms are possible.
There is also the fear expressed that the decision by the UK government to cut its support to Burundi could fuel an exodus of development partners with disastrous consequences for the country.

WHO BENEFITS?
POPULAR PERCEPTIONS ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION FROM BUJUMBURA

When Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC in 2007, there were feelings of unease within Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya (the founding EAC members). The source of this unease was due to the history of violence and economic instability within the two new members and their French language heritage. Why absorb two countries that could potentially spread violence within the EAC borders? There were also feelings of unease due to the complicated relationship that both Rwanda and Burundi shared with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Burundi’s case, why would the EAC partner states integrate a country whose peace accord had not been signed by every warring faction and was therefore technically still at war? The answer to this was that the partner states as well as the political leadership in Burundi felt that integration would stabilize both the region and the new member states. On the whole, this seemed to have worked. However, the decision to join the EAC and justifications made only resonated with political elites at the time. For many Burundians, the justification for joining the EAC and potential benefits that were expected has not been realized. During a recent visit to Bujumbura, this GHEA Outlook spoke with various members of civil society and the private sector as well as former and current politicians. One former politician, who spoke on condition of anonymity, sat down with the Outlook team to discuss how Burundians feel about regional integration. Who needs each other more, Burundi or the EAC?

“I really don’t know who needs each other more. Trading is still the same; the borders are still there. The only benefit I can say I’ve got personally is that I no longer have to pay the $20 fee that was paid at the airport. That’s all. There is no other benefit I can see as a person.”

Our source’s information underscored what this Outlook understood to be one of the main challenges of Burundi’s relationship with the EAC – an inferiority complex fueled by a lack of information, uncertainty and a sense of exclusion.

“It depends on the social category” the source answered when asked what perceptions Burundians have of the EAC and their neighbors.

“Three social categories exist in Burundi, the politicians, traders and the common people, you can even put civil servants within the common people because they are not totally involved in the EAC process.”

The source described the initial integration process as very lukewarm amongst the traders and common people. Only the politicians were eager to join and substantial efforts were not made to include or explain to the population why Burundi was entering the EAC. Even today, the benefits of the EAC are not entirely felt. “Nothing has changed inside Burundi,” the source explains “If we look at what the country faces [today] we are facing political problems, you look at Burundi we have a problem of leadership, problem of killings, problem of corruption, but the East Africa integration was supposed to bring a moral line for all the countries but it is blurred.” The most common expectation amongst Burundians was that once they joined the EAC, political stability would be established. They also expected other leaders within the EAC to rein in President Nkurunziza when things seemed to get out of hand.

Small-scale traders and retailers have also been hard hit by the new tax regime that was put in place after Burundi joined the EAC’s single market in 2010. One trader is reported to have said “We do not see any improvements in our business since Burundi joined the East African Community”vii The traders believe that the government is overtaxing them, resulting in declining profit margins and collapsing businesses.

According to Polycarpe Kubwayo, Executive Secretary of the Association of Burundian Cross-border Traders, some of his colleagues have left the country on account of the high taxation rates imposed by the government (up to 47% for non-exempted goods) and relocated to Mozambique, “where the fees are not as high as is the case in Burundi.” Furthermore, Mr. Kubwayo lamented the fact that the Burundi Revenue Authority does not display its rates so that traders may know how much they must pay exactly.viii It would seem that it is only the political elites who understand and benefit the most from the regional
In the eyes of some media observers, Burundi’s internal strife and lack of political freedoms would apparently disqualify it from being a member of the East African Community.

Integration process. For decades the state has played an instrumental and dominant role in shaping the Burundian economy. It is the largest employer with over 70,000 civil servants. With such a stranglehold on the economy and public sector, the private sector, potential entrepreneurs and investors have to work on a tightrope in order to increase investment and opportunity. They are also limited in how they can benefit from the regional integration process. “The benefit [for the political leadership and elites] is to be recognized by the other leaders. To be recognized, to be chairman of the EAC for one year, to have conferences and have Members of Parliament in Arusha paid, it’s a benefit for those people. I don’t see a benefit for our people.”

At the heart of the problem, which was expressed by the source and other members of civil society and the private sector, is the feeling of exclusion and perception that Burundi is still an outsider even within the EAC. Furthermore, the weak institutions in the country and the ongoing tensions mean that a return to armed conflict cannot be ruled out.

“I think war will end the [current] political system which we thought, after the peace process, would be for the benefit of all Burundians but it has been hijacked by a small group. They will do everything they can to stay.”

War it seems is inevitable, if progress isn’t made and if the EAC partner states maintain their passive relationship with Burundi.

**DOES BURUNDI BELONG IN THE EAC?**

Recently some regional newspapers have begun to question whether Burundi belongs in the EAC, in light of its internal strife and lack of political freedoms. In an editorial by *The East African* on June 23, 2012 (arguably the region’s leading weekly) that criticized Burundi’s track record of mistreating journalists, readers were treated to one of the
sharpest critiques and questioning of whether Burundi ‘belonged’ in the EAC:

“Burundi as a member of the East African community must measure up to the standards set by the regional bloc on governance and civil liberties.”

The editorial further warned:

“Burundi, despite its many post-war problems must embrace democracy and allow greater press freedom. Otherwise, it will drag the East African Community down.”

A few weeks later, The Daily Nation ran a piece called “Rwanda and Burundi: neighbours world apart” that compared the progress made by Rwanda and the stagnant state Burundi finds itself in. Throughout the piece the sentiment of Burundian exclusion as well as subtle questioning of why it is part of the EAC is raised:

“Burundi remains Francophone, the only one in the EAC bloc. In Burundi, one would be lucky to stumble upon any publication in English.”

This may be true but the sentiment seems to be one of disappointment because in Rwanda, English has been elevated as an official language. Why can’t Burundi be more like Rwanda? Though the author does not ask this outright, you get the sense that is one of the main questions he is asking.

The comparison continues:

“You enter Bujumbura and the disorder and apparent lack of national discipline that greets you is a stark reminder that you are in a true African city. In Rwanda, there seems to be a revolution that has transformed the national psyche, like has rarely been seen in post-colonial Africa.”

What is interesting regarding the editorial questioning Burundi’s membership in the EAC as well as the Rwanda/Burundi comparison is that you will not see such questions raised for Rwanda in light of its own political situation (freedom of the press and opposition). Both countries have the same political challenges, but Burundi seems to be the easier target.

Furthermore, it is unclear why ‘belonging’ needs to be specifically tied to the ability to use the English language. Kiswahili, for instance, has a much more universal appeal to the majority of East Africans, and as a matter of fact, many Burundians who took refuge in Tanzania during the long years of conflict would be much more comfortable in a regional community where Kiswahili was a cornerstone of facilitating social and cultural integration. Unless of course we agree that we must first integrate the elites whose Kiswahili skills are notoriously weak and therefore defer to English. The fact that Rwanda and Burundi are constantly being compared also neglects to take into account the specific differences in the development condition and their objective capacities to effect lasting change. Whilst Rwanda - with its more dirigiste approach - might be achieving results faster, it is nonetheless imperative that Burundi be examined without comparisons being made to other countries - and in particular, Rwanda.

Joy and disappointment as Burundi turns 50
Excerpted from Radio Netherlands Worldwide

Burundi is set for a grand party as the country celebrates that it gained independence from Belgium on July 1st, 1962. But half a century later the country is still dependent on a financial lifeline from foreign countries.

“It was a moment of great joy. I was 22, and I saw the Belgian flag being lowered before my eyes, Then, the Burundian flag went up. Now we had our own country,” recalls Professor Emile Mworoha, 72.

Troubled past
The first 50 years of Burundi as an independent country were a rocky ride. The trouble started with the assassination of the hugely popular Prince Rwagasore in 1961. After the death of the Rwagasore, son of the Tutsi king, ethnic clashes broke out between the two communities. The year 1972 marked another, deep ethnic crisis, in which an estimated 200,000 educated Hutu, were killed. The latest war, after the assassination of the first Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, lasted until 2005 and claimed around 300,000 lives.

Financial independence
“Are we really independent?” Laura Syori wonders. “Donors provide nearly half of our national budget,” she says. “It might take another generation to achieve financial independence. My generation.” She is the country’s top tennis player and is preparing to study abroad. “But I will certainly come back to help build my country,” she promises.

“The next 50 years will be better than the previous 50,” Mworoha, a former cabinet minister and president of the National Assembly, predicts. “We are going to integrate in East Africa, we will be part of the world. I am an optimist.”

Risk of instability
Burundi is still in danger of renewed instability. The country faced a string of politically motivated murders after the 2010 elections and there are continuing fears over dormant rebel groups. Sources in Gitega, Burundi’s second-largest city, whisper that there are rebels holed up in the nearby national park. The government prefers to call them ‘bandits’. Just a week ago, Burundian journalist Hassan Ruvakuki was handed a life sentence after interviewing the leader of this alleged rebel movement.

Also, “the land issue hasn’t been resolved yet,” warns Mvoroha. “Our land mass cannot increase but the population keeps growing. We have to work very hard to prevent more conflicts in the future.”
The underlying story here is that Kiswahili may be the problem and not the solution. Part of the reason why Rwanda has been able to attract so much investment, attention and development from the EAC and beyond compared to Burundi counterpart has been the full embrace of English. In many ways it is English, not Kiswahili that has been able to unify the entire EAC especially with the high failure rate in Kiswahili exams in Kenya and as Charles Onyango-Obbo explained (in private correspondence with the GHEA Outlook), the “de-Kiswahilisation in parts of Central, Western and Nyanza in Kenya is so much higher and Kiswahili is used less than it was in the 1970s.” The returns in Rwanda for instituting English as the official language has been felt throughout the education system, especially with the number of new private schools opening in Rwanda. This is important especially if Burundi wants to have a vibrant economy, many companies and development partners have not entered the Burundian market because of the language barrier at the expense of Burundian development. Should Burundi embrace English rather than Kiswahili?

**Expanding the democratic space**

Burundi has benefitted in other areas by integrating, simply by realizing the type of competition as well as the head start its neighbors have had. During a session with civil society groups in Bujumbura, participants told this GHEA Outlook that they no longer felt “intimidated by strangers” and were now feeling that regional integration is something that they can work with. Burundi is slowly waking up and the interest level has become very high. The civil society organizations (CSOs) told this Outlook that because of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), they feel more connected and protected. When the Burundian government recently tried to intimidate the CSOs the EALA protested. There is a sense that the democratic space in Burundi is not shrinking or depleting, as it would have had Burundi not been a part of the EAC.

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**SALVATION THROUGH DEEPER INTEGRATION?**

In another article by *The Daily Nation*, Lucas Barasa argues that despite the numerous troubles Burundi faces, being a part of the EAC has given the country a major boost both in economics and confidence. Beyond the hard development indicators, there has also been soft development through exposure, the increased movement of people across Burundian borders and the transformation of Bujumbura into a viable East African hub for conferences.

The former Burundian Minister responsible for East African Community affairs, Mrs. Hafsa Mossi admitted that Burundi’s integration and joining the EAC saved the country from not just complete economic and political isolation but destitution as well.

“Because of the war crisis we faced in the past, the whole region had put sanctions on our country and no country wanted to open up economic or development activities or allow their citizens to travel to our Burundi […] but when we joined the EAC, the sanctions were removed and that saved us from isolation. We now sit at the same table and discuss our future collectively.”

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*Burundi Peacekeepers in Somalia*
Punching above its weight in the region

Burundi's stance and political clout grew exponentially when the government decided to send its troops to stabilize Somalia under the guise of the African Union's Peacekeeping Mission (AMISOM). Charles Obbo of the Nation Media Group pointedly described President Nkurunziza's decision:

"In a move you can't begrudge him, he shamed many bigger, richer, and stable African countries when he sent troops from his poor nation to the African Union's Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), at a time when only Uganda had the stomach (or was mad enough) to do so."\textsuperscript{xvi}

It was telling at the time that one of the smallest countries in the EAC sent its troops to one of the most volatile countries in the Horn of Africa. The decision to do so may have also had an economic motivation since the country would receive financial compensation for sending its troops to Somalia. When AMISOM troops recaptured Mogadishu earlier this year and pushed al-Shabaab out of the city, Burundi's early commitment was vindicated. Perhaps on matters of security and stability Burundi would have the necessary political clout to influence key decisions in the future one that would directly affect its own stability - stabilizing the DRC.

Interestingly enough, at the end of 2011, Burundi was the only member state of the EAC that had fully paid up its dues for the year. Not only had it met its statutory budgetary obligations of $6.7 million but had gone further and paid an extra $2.3 million for a total contribution of some $9 million.\textsuperscript{xvii} This zeal is perhaps a key indicator of the premium with which Burundi's leadership treats its membership in this regional body.

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INSIGHT AND FORESIGHT

From the foregoing, the development situation in Burundi remains critical and there is a growing perception that the fruits of regional integration are yet to be seen. With a growing tax burden, growing unemployment and more generally, growing inequalities overlaid on a fragile truce, there is need to be more sensitive to the impatience with regional integration. Ironically, whilst Burundi is clearly doing its best to be a model member of the regional community, it seems to have neglected the equally important task of communicating the reasons for its membership and the fact that gains will neither be immediate nor as widely spread as might be imagined.

The country has laid out an ambitious strategy, the Burundi Vision 2025 in which it seeks to ‘achieve sustainable development in order to ensure better life for its population... by harnessing its people's own resources’.\textsuperscript{xviii} This vision highlights six challenges that need to be tackled in order for it to come to fruition:

a) Reconstruct national unity and a nation that is secure and at peace
b) Control demographic growth and ensure food security
c) Resolve the crucial problem of unemployment and boost household incomes
d) Diversify and promote a competitive economy
e) Implement appropriate infrastructure to promote production
f) Raise the literacy level and create competent professionals

When looking at the goals set out in greater detail, they are truly ambitious: for instance, the country seeks to reduce the percentage of its population living below the poverty
line to approximately 10% by 2025 (from around 70% in 2010). Given its point of departure, and the performance of past years, it could be easy for skeptics to dismiss this vision as a pipe dream and revert to more base predictions about the future of the country.

It is not for this Outlook to cast aspersions as to the viability or lack thereof of Burundi’s vision. However, a few comments can be made with respect to regional integration and Burundi’s future.

1. **The Burundi development dilemma is an East African problem:** There is a need for the regional integration partners to take a more critical look at the development parameters of Burundi and to explore how they can contribute to improve them, particularly in light of the decline of traditional development aid resources. In this respect, Burundi could engage at the official level to explore what sort of interventions could be put in place to support and sustain development objectives. That a member of the EAC will not meet any of the MDGs should be a collective shock to the body and galvanize it into action. But this situation should also offer an opportunity for civil society groups and other non-governmental development partners to explore ways and means to contribute actively. The Burundi Vision 2025 could serve as a blue print that guides and indicates entry points for action.

2. **Plan for Success, Prepare for Shortfalls?** As stated above, the gaps that development interventions seek to narrow are ambitious and will clearly require significant investments in terms of financial, technological and human capital. Whether all of these resources are going to be available, and more importantly, when and where they are needed is not very clear from the documents that we have perused. Beyond this, it is obvious that there will be many other externalities that will influence the attainment of the stated objectives. As such, having a clear and adjustable roadmap will be helpful not only for communication purposes, but also for calibrating expectations within the population.

3. **Work with converts, avoid skeptics:** Many believe that Burundi is a failed case and the increasingly strident voices in a section of the regional press are an indicator of this fact. Nonetheless, it would be in the interest of the EAC and its partners to work to provide ‘facts on the ground’ that undermine the skeptics arguments rather than engage in futile exchanges. In particular, such efforts should seek to defuse the conflict potential and harness the energy of the population in ways that are constructive to the regional integration process. Investments that seek to take advantage of Burundi’s strategic location could be signal in this effort and could also provide new jobs and evidence that the integration process can work for all, and not just the elites.

4. **Beware of veterans:** Burundi has made a significant contribution to regional peace, particularly in the Horn of Africa through its peacekeepers serving under the flag of the African Union forces in Somalia (AMISOM). Beyond the obvious contribution to calming the factions in Somalia, the peacekeeping mission is providing the Burundian soldiers with a chance to create a strong national and professional army, something new considering its composition, which included ex-rebels who were integrated into the armed forces at the conclusion of the peace process. Whilst all of this is good, reinserting battle hardened, well-trained soldiers into a development context that is at best creeping along glacially could end up creating new tensions that prove to be harder to manage. Returning veterans could end up being enticed into rebel

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**Next 3 years could determine Burundi’s future**

*Excerpted from the International Peace Institute*


“Burundi has the opportunity to be an extraordinary success, and whether it is or not may be determined in the next three years,” said Karin Landgren, the outgoing Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Burundi, during an IPI event on July 16, 2012.

Ms. Landgren served as SRSG for Burundi and Head of the UN’s Office in Burundi (BNUB) for 18 months, from January 2011 to July 2012.

“There are huge, long-term threats to Burundi. This is, depending how you count, the world’s third poorest or the world’s fifth poorest country.’’ The Burundian population faces an array of problems, including land shortages, a severe overpopulation issue, susceptibility to climate change, and dependency on a failing agricultural system.

Despite these issues, Ms. Landgren sees Burundi, a nation recovering from civil war, as relatively stable in terms of security. "It’s quite ironic that most of Burundi’s negative press lately has been over security."

Ms. Landgren also expressed concern over the extrajudicial killings that have been taking place in Burundi. "The UN mission documented 61 extrajudicial killings in Burundi in 2011. They were not all manifestly political, and they were certainly not the sum total of extrajudicial killings in Burundi that year," she said. "Impunity is a continuing issue, a continuing problem."

The number of extrajudicial killings in Burundi has decreased in 2012, perhaps in response to the Security Council’s resolution in December of 2011 that called for an end to such acts in the nation.

"The UN has been discussing transitional justice with Burundi since 2006. In 2009, there was quite an important national consultation process, which was tripartite: government, UN, and civil society." The process showed that most Burundians want a transitional justice process to take place. But this process seems to have slowed down since.

"There is not a complete consensus in the international community about the outlook for Burundi. The glass is half empty or half full. What is going to be very important is that the international community as a whole encourage Burundi to pursue the reforms, to pursue the reconciliation that are vital and not to abandon the country on the basis that it’s gotten through its bad times, so it no longer needs us as much as it did. That would be the wrong thing to do at this point."
factions or to serve as soldiers of fortune or perhaps even gang together to try and wrest power from the elected government. All the more reason why the peace process needs to be concluded and investments made in demonstrating the dividends from the peace as well as regional integration.

5. **Clarify the value of Burundi’s membership of the EAC:** This needs to be done both internally and externally - with the other partners. The perception that the EAC will not lose much if Burundi were to drop out of the community needs to be countered. Putting in place programmes that facilitate and strengthen interaction between East African citizens, particularly on the aspects that affect their livelihoods could facilitate knowledge and experience sharing that will demonstrate the value of the regional community.

With these comments in mind, this Outlook envisions three scenarios that Burundi’s might have to face.

**The Jumuiya Scenario**

The Jumuiya (Community) Scenario is one that encompasses a complete shift in the EAC approach to integrating Burundi. In this scenario both Burundi and the EAC partner states make a concerted effort in making sure Burundians are integrated more and not just at the level of political elites. All key stakeholders in the region ‘buy in’ to embracing and integrating Burundi fully into the EAC.

This scenario is driven by enthusiastic engagement by both the partner states and a proactive Burundian government and population. With increased exposure and engagement the state loosens its grip on the economy and allows for a vibrant private sector that catalyzes entrepreneurship. Simultaneously efforts are made to improve the language barrier that exists between Burundi and the other EAC partner states, specifically Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. There is a push by the governments of Kenya and Uganda to send teachers to Burundi to teach English. As a gesture of reciprocity, French is made an official language of the EAC and practical steps are made to be more inclusive and close the language barrier such as having translators at EAC Summits and East African Legislative Assembly sessions.

In this scenario Burundi takes advantage of its geo-strategic location through the port of Bujumbura. As a result Burundi becomes a gateway to providing goods and transport services to countries bordering Lake Tanganyika, especially eastern Congo. The development of intense mining and other economic activities in Burundi, eastern Congo and Rwanda uses efficiently and relies on the services that provided by the port.

With increased integration and exposure, political and economic stability is gradually attained and governments and private donors expand and invest in Burundi. Burundi becomes the regional anchor in addressing the conflict in the DRC in spite of the re-emergence of political tensions between Rwanda, Burundi and the EAC.

**The Détente Scenario**

The Détente Scenario entails the continuation of status quo and lukewarm relationship Burundi has with the EAC. This mirrors the current situation Burundi finds itself in where it is included in the regional integration process at the periphery (political elites) but excluded at the constituency level. Burundi is not fully excluded from the regional integration process but it is not fully included either.

The key drivers of this scenario are an unenthusiastic and non-committal relationship by the partner states. This sentiment is further exacerbated by the entry of South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia in the EAC. As a result Burundi’s presence in the EAC diminishes. Although South Sudan and Somalia are much more unstable than Burundi they are of a greater geopolitical importance further contributing to Burundi’s marginalization.

Burundi will continue to be a part of the EAC but only by name. In this context, low-level civil unrest and political skirmishes continue and because of the challenges that come with integrating South Sudan and Somalia, internal strife in Burundi is largely ignored. This has a direct impact on the Burundian economy and stagnates political development. Economic convergence, which is necessary to deepen their integration and for them to join the East African monetary union is not reached and
consequently the country is not included in the monetary union when this historic moment comes to pass.

Burundians are left with a sense of wanting to be helped but with no outlet or support that can provide this leaving them increasingly disgruntled with their relationship with the EAC.

The Collapse Scenario

The collapse scenario sees Burundi and the EAC’s relationship deteriorate completely. The collapse and eventual exit from the EAC by Burundi is exacerbated by internal strife and conflict that reaches a tipping point leading to war. The deepening corruption, increased poverty and inequality and political killings escalate unabated over the years. What leads to complete collapse is the inability of the EAC partner states to intervene and stop the conflict. The partner states are hesitant in using their political capital and have a peacekeeping force sent to Burundi. They believe such capital would be better served in South Sudan and Somalia. Burundi’s strategic position in the community is not considered with the same acuity that the partner states had during the post-election violence in Kenya when it was both in the national and regional interest to stabilize Kenya given the ramifications of the conflict on the region.

This scenario also sees a regional shift from West to East, where countries like Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia increase their prominence at the expense of Burundi and the DRC.

Unfortunately for Burundians, politically and economically marginalized and now at war again, this represents a negative swing of the pendulum as they went from being isolated to being partially integrated to being isolated once again.

Endnotes

i. Department for International Development [DFID] (2010). Joining up Africa Regional Economic Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa
iv. Ibid
v. The Closure of DFID’s Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi by the House of Commons International Development Committee (Tenth Report of Session 2010-2012).
vi. Ibid

xi. Ibid
xiii. Ibid